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Abstract 
This lecture explores the general economic determinants of 
market structure with special reference to the airline industry. 
Included are the following facets: absolute size of firms: 
distributions of firms by size: concentration: entry barriers: 
product and service differentiation: diversification; degrees 
of competition: vertical integration: market boundaries: and 
economies of scale. Also examined are the static and dyn&mic 
properties of market structure in terms of mergers, government 
policies, and economic growth conditions. 
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William Raduchel 
I would like to talk about the classical economic 
tradeoff: efficiency vs. equity. In order to try to say 
something we try to set up models. One of the areas in whiqh 
we do this is industrial organization: the structure, conduct 
and performance of one industry or a group of industries. 
There is quite a'bit of work done here, but I don't think 
it's all quite applicable to the airline industry, 
Now, all these models begin by assuming a) that we'r~ 
dealing with firms, b) that these firms produce a homo-
geneous product that is not really subject to much quality 
variation. As a consequence of that the only attribute of 
this product which the firm controls is the price. Now 
these are sort of zeroth order assumptions, but they beg a 
lot of questions, particularly: What's the f~rm? What's 
the homogeneous product? and What's the price? 
The firm I think is best defined implic~t1y: we 
say that it is the decision making center. Someone makes 
decisions controlling inputs and producing outputs. Some~ 
body takes information (basically assumed to be prices frPm 
particular markets) and makes decisions combining these factors 
by taking in the inputs and produces outputs. We assume this 
decision maker, whoever he is, has some goal and the goal is 
usually that he maximizes profit, defined as the difference (PIa 
between revenue and cost. Now this is obviously a somewhat 
strained definition: between the economic firm and American 
Airlines the~e is obviously quite a bit of difference. The 
firm is related to the modern concept of the profit center • 
.. ~ut you seldom have a particular group of people who make one 
product, control one price. and take the other prices in from 
the market. and produce an output. 
In defense of the economics of a firm it is true that 
we do try to practice profit maximization. The perennial 
argument that the firms don't maximize profits is really 
rather spurious because we don't really have to claim it for 
most of the conclusions that we reach. We don't need the 
fact that the firms have a profit function where they set all 
of the first deLivatives to zero and find a maximum. For most 
of the conclusions all we really need is that the firm strives 
for the maximum in profit. There are some questions as to 
how fast they get there. 
The difference is between analytically maximizing the 
function against numerically maximizing it. The outcome is 
the same. All we really need to postulate is that the firm 
is trying. for this goal; it is not necessary to reach it 
right away. 
As we.set up this kind of world we can distinguish two 
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determinate market structures which Professor Tideman talked 
about earlier; these are competition and monopoly. Now I'm 
certain that nobody here really believes that either of these 
serves as a realistic model. But again. that's not really 
their purpose: their purpose is to provide a standard. to 
provide an ideal. If we had such and such a situation. we 
would have the resulting outcome which would have certain 
properties. We can then compare existing situations to these 
standards and try to infer from that something about the pro-
perties. In competition we end up with a long run equili-
brium situation in which the only sustainable price is equal 
to the long run average cost which in turn is equal to the 
marginal cost. This is because of the requirement. that the 
only sustainable condition occurs when each firm is producing 
at its mimimum long run average cost. This situation appeals 
to the economist as it is the most efficient solution: there's 
no way to make you better off without making somebody else worse 
off. 
The contrast to this is a monopoly situation in which we 
can't say very much about price or quantity but we can say that 
the firm. if it's going to maximize profits. will balance off 
the gains to revenue from any action against the additional 
costs incurred. When these are equal. profits will be at a 
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maximum. Again this raises all sorts of questions like the 
term over which the firm is thinking about: short or long 
run profits. Things may be very destructive to.profits in 
the short run and very crucial to profits in the long run. 
Most of these questions, however, are ignored and the 
more realistic models all deal with the world of imperfect 
competition. The reason that we don't talk much about the 
problems I guess is because you really can't say very mUCh. 
You must begin to assume that the firm is really behavorial, 
that, c.fter all, a firm is managed by a group of individuals. 
The individuals have various goals: they have stock in the 
company, or they do not have stock in the company. The stock 
may be a small part of the company's net worth; but it may 
be a very large part of the Chief Executive's net worth, so 
he would be interested in maximizing capital gains. A variety 
of circumstances are going to affect the behavior in the top 
managements: status and prestige, particularly. The results 
of these influences are something that we can call slack. 
This again is particularly important. When we talked 
about the production policies that each firm was following, we 
assumed the firm ended up on the production function, and so 
it was getting the most possible output from any given set of 
inputs. Well, it's doubtful that the firms are always there 
~/K 
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and the question really is how close they are. There has been 
a lot of argument that in fact we have quite a lot of 
slack in the U.S. economy. Big firms do not get the most 
out of their inputs. Workers could produce more, and 
machinery could be used more heavily. This, of course, is 
a very hard thing to talk about because we don't have any 
measures. There's no way of telling how much a firm could 
have produced unless you find a more efficient firm that is 
really identical and find they're producing 10 times as much 
output as you are from the same input. Then you're ineffi-
cient. Unfortunatley you seldom have those comparisons. This 
means is if there is slack and you have a management that's 
composed of people who have a variety of goals, they aren't 
necessarily bound to the market. If demand falls off a little 
bit, they can still keep profits up by becoming a little better 
managers. At the same time, if the demand is really soaring, 
managers may take more leisure time and may not worry so much 
about the office. They take trips to waterville Valley or 
something like that. This type of play in the system is not 
really talked about, and we don't really have a role for it 
in the competitive model at all: we assume it isn't there. 
Managers also have control over quality. In the air-
line industry, as we will talk about a little bit later. there 
is really enormous control over the various other attributes 
in terms of the size of the steak, the size of the salads, 
and things like this. In a big firm you have tremendous 
capacity to alter the quality of the product that you pro-
duce. Related to quality is advertising. Firms compete to 
a large extent by different selling of their wares in the 
media. This helps to distinguish their product. A product 
which is sold only by television advertising is a lot dif-
ferent than a product sold by somebody who never has any 
access to television. It's not surprising that certain 
industries, particularly the drug industry or household 
product industries, prefer to spend 150% of the first 2 
or 3 years' revenues in advertising. A good example is 
Cornet Cleanser. 
Again. this really doesn't effect the economic models 
because in the competitive situation the firm has to be on 
its long-run average. It if isn't, it is going to go out 
of business. 
In a monopoly there's no need to advertise. because you 
are the entire industry so that if anybody wants to buy your 
product, they have to buy it from you. In this area of im-
perfect competition there's one strain of views which is 
associated with Professor Galbraith. who is probably not the 
most popular economist in the profession. He has stressed 
one point, which I think today most people are willing to 
accept: in this area of imperfect competion goals are 
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important. We talked about the group which he calls the 
technostructure, which is just his name for the group at the 
top which runs the company: the management. He stresses 
that they have goals and that probably the foremost goal is 
corporate autonomy (protecting yourself). This mandates 
certain economic criteria: minimum acceptable profit rates 
and minimum growth rates (Exactly What the tradeoff is be-
tween them nobody knows.). There are such situations and 
these kinds of goals are formulated. 
Then we have a variety of other behavioral models, 
satifying models. Firms don't try to maximize profits, they 
try to maximize some other function. In other words, they 
simply try to get at least a 5% increase in profits over 
last year. The problem with all these models is that there 
is very little we can say in terms of determining the outcome. 
In fact, we can't say whether this is going to be efficient 
or inefficient; we don't know. It's possible to have a firm 
in imperfect competition that is producing a very gOOd pro-
duct of high quality, at low cost, doesn't spend much money 
on advertising, and has all the nice economic attributes .. 
Equally so we could have an opposite firm that produced a 
horrible product, bad quality and high prices; it was able 
to maintain a position by very wasteful advertising. 
How do we apply this to the airline :industry? Well, I 
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decided what we really wanted to do was to try to answer five 
questions: 
1. What is the industry? 
2. What is the product? 
3. What is the market? 
4. What is the competition? 
5. wi thin the industry itself, what are the means of competition? 
First, what is the industry? It's a variety of indus-
tries. .There are the trunk carriers. These are the major 
airlines. These were created and designed to provide basic 
city to city transport between major city points, major pop-
ulation centers. The next level is what is called the regional 
carriers. These were created to be feeder airlines to bring 
air service to the rest of America and to provide ways for the 
people in these areas to get to central cities and to major 
population centers to get on trunks and then go back. In 
order to. do this, a subsidy program was set up by the Federal 
Government to glarantee that these airlines would serve small 
cities that otherwise couldn't justify it. 
There have grown up, in addition to these, a variety of 
others. There are supplemental carriers which basically do 
a charter business or freight business. These are very important 
internationally but less so domestically. There are carriers 
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which carry only freight; for· example. Flying Tiger Airlines. 
The regional carriers are North Central. Mohawk. Allegheny. 
and Ozark. etc.; and supplementals are something like World. 
Lately there are the third level carriers. which are the air 
taxis. the small airlines. 
Allegheny Airlines is the regional carrier which has 
been very successful in using third level carriers as a means 
of reducing its obligations to serve small points. Under co~­
tract Allegheny yields its route to a commuter company which 
agrees to call itself Allegheny Commuter Airlines. In turn. 
Allegheny performs certain services for them. What you have 
are third level carriers feeding into the regional carriers. 
which in turn are becoming more and more like trunk carriers. 
Regionals now often serve major cities; they often provide 
service between major population centers as well and are very 
apt to be competing with trunks on cer~ routes. 
Finally. there is the category of intrastate carriers. 
particularly in California. Alaska. and Hawaii. They are hard 
to classify; for some of them are quite large and some are 
quite small. 
The obvious product is transportation. You get o~ an 
airline and move from point A to point B. What matters also 
is how convenient it is to make reservations. what the ground 
arrangements there are when you get to the airport, and was it 
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a convenient trip? You may fly American both ways, even 
though an Eastern flight is more convenient because your car 
is parke'ci at 'an AIDerican' garage, which is a 15 minute walk 
from the Eastern terminal. There are a variety of things on 
the ground which would affect your choice of which plane you 
take such as the time ~'our plane takes off and the type of 
plane you get. If you get a ne9, you'll feel cramped; SO 
you want a 727. Also what inflight service do you get? Do 
you get a snack or do you get a whole meal? 
Again, this complicates the product. All the airlines 
really have to provide is transportation, and they have to 
provide transportation either 6 abreast or 4 abreast. That's 
all they are legally required to ,do; everything else is com-
pletely under their control. At a time of strict economic 
conditions they can cut down on a lot of the extras. Alter-
natively. when traffic is booming. when they're trying to 
get more people on and when they make certain that they don't 
lose you because they thing that you £e going to be travelling 
alot; they provide varieties of frills which really don't 
cost very much. aithough they are not cheap. (The average 
cost of a lunch in coach is something like $4.50 where the 
average cost of a snack is $3.80; there's not a great deal 
'of difference. On the other hand. w~,n United Airlines cut 
out serving Macademia Nuts on their trip from Hawaii. they 
saved a total of several hundred thousand dollars over giving 
you a package of regular nuts.) Since 
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they fly so many. even (p;;.t/ 
minor changes in service can mean major total cOst considera~ 
tions. This is the slack I was talking about before. The 
airlines as an industry are characterized by an enormous 
degree of variability, particularly with respect to passenger 
service. 
In times of economic turndown, a greater share of the 
passengers are people who really have to fly. They are not 
passengers that have alternatives in terms of 
not flying! They are going to fly any way. You may not have 
to give them good service. As you get more marginal customers 
who dan't have to fly, you have to keep them happy and 
at the same time keep everybody else happy. This means that 
you provide unofficial services. 
Next, what is the market? Again, you separate this 
by purpose, (business vs. personal), and city pair (because 
it's clear that there are thousands of markets in the U.S. 
which are basically each city pair: Boston-WashingtQn is 
one market, Boston-New York is another, Washington-qhicago, 
Washington-L.A.--these are all different markets.) It's 
not fair to say that there is only one market for airline 
travel, because again you have different proportions of busi~ 
ness and pleasure travellers on each route and too many dif-
ferent considerations involved. In pleasure travel, again to 
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Washington, .. peop;I.e: arell)uch mo,re likely to take the car be-
... 
cause it's a shorter flight and they can drive it very easily 
- -. , 
in one day. For California, it's a different situation; 
you're likely to have a great proportion of your travellers 
wanting to go by air. You have to distinguish feeder routes, 
which connect rural areas, to the population centers or the 
trunk routes, On international flights, you have questions 
about how long the flights are, whether it is a non-stop 
flight (or 7 stops along the way). Again you can have markets 
in which the airlines can decide to service only business 
customers. If there are some pleasure customers they take 
them, but they direct their appeal to business or vice versa. 
What is the competition? Well, obviously there are the 
other carriers. if there is more than one on a paticular route. 
There are trains in some areas, buses, and passenger cars. 
particularly for personal travel the auto is the greatest 
competitor. For business travel I would suggest that one of 
the biggest competitors is no travel at all. Telephone, tele-
type, telex, or various other things substitute imperfectly 
but work almost as well when air travel is expensive. 
How do the carriers compete? Well, here you have as 
many ways as have been listed so far. There are all those 
things that vary services or quality. They can vary advertising; 
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they can vary their prices. This is a regulated industry where 
prices are all established--technically they are not, but in 
,. 
effect they end up· being the same as if established by the 
Civil Aeronautics Board. However, in certain cases an air~ 
line is able to compete in price when its cost structure is 
different from the cost structure of one of its competitors, 
Some carriers may be able to support a lower fare. The 
marginal profits of certain operations is higher in some air~ 
lines than it is in others. American, for example, claimed 
for years that the youth fare (they were the initiator of it) 
was profitable, where some of the other airlines said this 
wasn't true and that they found it to be expensive. If cost 
structures are different, (you fly a different aircraft on a 
route or the destinations are both intermediate stops on longer 
routes), then you can offer special discount fares which the 
other carriers really can match only at much greater costs. 
There is a problem in competition because there seems to 
be some evidence that the proportion of seats you sellon 
certain routes does not vary directly with proportion of 
seats you offer. If you decide you want to go from a 10% 
to a 15% market share you may have to double your capacity 
from, say, 20% to 40%. There is a nonlinear relationship 
between the capacity you offer and the number of seats you 
sell. This particularly favors the established airline, the 
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dominant airline will tend .to become more dominant. The more 
capaci ty he is able to offer, the more seats he's going to be 
able to sell because people get used to it. People learn 
. that Eastern flie,s every hour on the hour or American flies 
every haif hour on the hour, but the other airlines only 
every two hours. So, if they want to take the next flight, 
they just call that airline first. 
And, of course, airlines compete with various types of 
aircraft. There is a lot of competition in advertising of-
fering nelO's with their lounges, or 747's with their lounges, 
as opposed to some other type of plane. The airlines have 
a variety of ways to compete but none of them are really 
directly price related, though they cost the airlines various 
amounts of money. It is very hard to say anything about 
.which type provides which benefits for such and such a cost. 
If we do want to characterize the industry, I think we can 
say a couple of things largely deal ing with this idea that you 
have to have a large capacity to guarantee a large share of the 
seats. It is what's called a heavy fixed-cost industry. The 
marginal cost, the additional cost of putting you on a plane 
when the plane is not full, is obviously very close to zero. 
Except for the amount of food and beverage service you may 
get on board and maybe a couple of minor things, such as losses 
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on baggage, etc.--that's it: and the entire cost is peanuts. 
In the short run you have a fixed number of planes which are 
on set routes, these routes are scheduled flights (you must 
fly them according to the regulations) and so there's very 
little you can do. Even your labor is fixed (you have strict 
contracts on your labor). It takes time to train 
a pilot. You cannot overnight say, well, "I'm busy tomor-
row on this flight so I'm going to take a 707 out and put a 
747 in." You may not have a 747 pilot or a whole 747 crew. 
You may have the aircraft but you don't have the labor to 
switch. You have a very restricted industry which really 
has to live within the constraints of the schedule. There 
is very little ability to get around it. As a consequence 
you have massive price discrimination. The people flying 
on the same plane are paying a large variety of fares, 
particularly on a long flight such as from N.Y. to the West 
Coast. You have family plans, you have youth fare, you have 
military fares, you have military stand-by, military reserved, 
youth fare reserved, so the airlines get to pick and choose 
by offering different types of service and different contin-
gencies under which they mayor may not board you. They get 
to offer these lower fares to people who might otherwise take 
another way. Eastern's Leisure Class, I guess, is a particularly 
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good example. 
The other thing that is characteristic of the airlines 
is cross subsidization. There is no passenger who pays 
exactly average costs. Every passenger is being subsidized 
by some other passenger or he in turn is subsidizing some 
other passenger. This is particularly true on the regional 
carriers where there is a formal subsidy program whereby the 
CAB each year requests Congress for enough money to subsi-
dize these carriers so that they don't lose money for servi-
cing small points which board very few people. What the CAB 
does is grant route strengthening awards. The way you 
stabilize an airline in financial trouble is to give it a 
profitable route. What this means, of course, is that the 
people who are flying on that route are making money for the 
airlines and in turn are being used to subsidize fares on 
another route. Everybody charges the same fare. In Califor-
nia there isPSA (Pacific Southwest Airlines) which is an 
intrastate carrier which flies you from L.A. to San Fran-
cisco and vice versa for about ~ of the fare that you would 
pay if you ~e. flying an interstate car;r::i.e.r,,~.:ul>ject to CAB. rules. 
<: ".~:.' - -'"', !. ";,"'::' -:-) 'j. ,,'- •... --" .• ,\~ ••.•• " :. ~ \. 
The CAB pricing formula is basically a cer.tain fixed amount 
~;::i:. ,; ' .. "" \'; .C.-. )'.' ,': "'.: \> ;,t- .\ ',' "; 1:;;,-'- .' ' .. i:- 1',: . .' .. ';.J ,;;:;1" .. ' 'j,'-;" 
for each ticket plus so many cents per mile, .. and the sp-many-
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cents per mile varies with. how long .. the (light is. There 
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are much cheaper fares at PSA, so there has been consider-
able question about how justified the high fares are from 
Washington to Boston. If you had PSA flying Washington to 
Boston the fare would be just half as much. 
The last thing that we want to talk about is the fact 
that we are dealing wit h the regulators. The trunks and the 
regional carriers are completely under the control of the 
CAB. The CAB has numerous powers. They must approve all 
tariffs. This means they must set all prices. To determine 
if a tariff is fair or not they determine what should be 
rate base of the company. By this they add up in some way 
to determine the total amount of capital invested in the firm. 
Secondly, they try to determine the fair rate of return. Now 
both of these are nearly impossible questions to get a com-
pletely solid analytical answer to. HoW do you value planes? 
Do you value them at their new cost? Replacement costs? What 
you sell them for in the market? How do you eva'luate a fair 
rate of return? There are some risks involved for the air-
lines certainly because of the fact that they are scheduled 
carriers; they must fly. 
The most important power is the power to gain control 
of routes. The CAB controls which route you are able to fly. 
Now this can be crucial. If you're a regional carrier and 
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you just bought some long distance airplanes and you're 
flying a lot of short hauls, you may desperately need some 
longer routes. North Central Airlines, for example, flies 
nonstop Milwaukee-New York, which is totally non-regional 
service. These routes were given in an effort to strengthen 
the airline so they could lower the subsidy. What this means 
in effect is that these people who fly North Central from 
Milwaukee to New York, or Minneapolis to Denver are in 
effect subsidizing the people who fly on North Central from 
Grand Forks to Hibbing and something like that. When you're 
flying on these puddle jumps you're being subsidized by the 
larger, longer routes. The same airplane which is flying you 
on the short haul may as soon as it gets to Milwaukee or 
Minneapolis or Madison turn around and become a long haul 
plane and fly to New York. How do you once again separate 
the costs? You can't do it. Anything that you came up with 
would be purely a mrt:t:e r of convention. 
The CAB also controls entry, but the more important 
issue is that they control mergers. This relates to the 
economies of scale. If you get larger and larger airlines, 
are they going to be more efficient in providing service? 
There is some argument for this: you use your plane more 
intensively, you can guarantee the use of your pilots, you 
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have one reservation center, you may be able to handle a 
lot of people, and a lot more cities very easily. Once you 
set up the software and the hardware to handle all your 
division centers, it's good enough to handle maybe double or 
triple what you have so that there are clearly some economies 
of scale. Is competition good? Is service to an area really 
improved by having competition? Well, what is all this saying? 
There really are an enormous amount of things that you have 
to consider when you try to determine analytically whether 
should we do this or that. The issues involved are extremely 
complex. They involve the industry, the product, the market, 
what the competition is on the route, and, particularly here, 
social concerns. In Washington National you have the noise 
pollution of the planes flying over Georgetown. In fact 
there are some safety factors involved; there have been a couple 
of air crashes that have been attributed to trying to lower 
noise in flight procedures. 
On the other hand it is clear that a flight from Boston 
to Dulles is not the same as a flight from Boston to National 
for most people. So the product that the airlines provides is 
in terms of transportation from inner city point to inner city 
point. It involves a lot of variables which are beyond the 
airlines' control in a direct sense is limited. 
&33 
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